García-Gómez, P., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2025). Private Equity Buyouts and Employee Health. Management Science (forthcoming).

Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2025). The Voting Premium. The Journal of Finance (forthcoming).

•  Slides,  Internet Appendix

• Short summary:  CLS Blue Sky Blog

Maug, E. (2025). Financing Human Capital: A Survey and Synthesis. Foundations and Trends in Finance (forthcoming).

Levit, D., Malenko, N. and Maug, E. (2024). Trading and Shareholder Democracy. The Journal of Finance, 79, 257–304.

• Brattle Group First Prize in Corporate Finance at the Journal of Finance

• Semi-finalist in the John L. Weinberg/IRRCi Research Paper Award Competition

• Slides,  Video for ECGI,  JF link,  Internet Appendix, SSRN

• Short summaries: Harvard Law School Forum,  CLS Blue Sky Blog,  Finance Theory Insights 

• Presentation at the ECGI Spotlight Series 

Li, S. Z., Maug, E. and Schwartz-Ziv, M. (2021). When Shareholders Disagree: Trading After Shareholder Meetings. The Review of Financial Studies, 35, 1–71.

Klein, D. and Maug, E. (2020). How Do Executives Exercise Their Stock Options? The Review of Corporate Finance Studies : RCFS, 9, 302–339.

Antoni, M., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2019). Private Equity and Human Capital Risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 133, 634–657.

Kim, E H., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2018). Labor Representation in Governance as an Insurance Mechanism. Review of Finance, 22, 1251-1289.

• Short summary: Harvard Law School Forum

Focke, F., Maug, E. and Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). CEOs Earn Less at More-Prestigious Firms. Harvard Business Review : HBR, 2017, 2–4.

• Short summary: Harvard Business Review Blog

Focke, F., Maug, E. and Niessen-Ruenzi, A. (2017). The Impact of Firm Prestige on Executive Compensation. Journal of Financial Economics, 123, 313–336.

Klein, O., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2017). Trading Strategies of Corporate Insiders. Journal of Financial Markets, 34, 48–68.

Hillert, A., Maug, E. and Obernberger, S. (2016). Stock Repurchases and Liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics, 119, 186–209.

Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. and Mechtenberg, L. (2014). Why Votes Have Value : Instrumental Voting with Overconfidence and Overestimation of Others' Errors.Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 17–38.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2013). Indexing Executive Compensation Contracts. The Review of Financial Studies, 26, 3182-3224.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Zhang, D. (2011). Restricting CEO Pay. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 1200-1220.

Maug, E. and Albrecht, B. (2011). Struktur und Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung : Fakten und Mythen. Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung : Zfbf, 63, 858–881.

Maug, E. and Naik, N. (2011). Herding and Delegated Portfolio Management : The Impact of Relative Performance Evaluation on Asset Allocation. The Quarterly Journal of Finance : QJF, 1, 265–292.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2010). Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They Are Worth, and Why They Are (Still) There? Review of Finance, 14, 35–71.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Spalt, O. (2010). Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation When Managers Are Loss Averse. The Journal of Finance, 65, 2015–2050.

Güth, W., Kröger, S. and Maug, E. (2009). Bargaining Under Large Risk – an Experimental Analysis. New Zealand Economic Papers, 43, 105–129.

Maug, E. and Rydqvist, K. (2009). Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposals Screening, and Majority Rules. Review of Finance, 13, 47–79.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Schneider, C. (2008). How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe. Financial Management, 37, 571–598.

Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2007). Lower Salaries and No Options: The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay. The Journal of Finance, 62, 303–343.

Güth, W. and Maug, E. (2007). Who Volunteers? A Theory of Firms Allowing for Intrinsically Motivated Agents. Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft : ZfB, 77, 49–74.

Maug, E. (2006). Efficiency and Fairness in Minority Freezeouts: Takeovers, Overbidding, and the Freeze-In Problem. International Review of Law and Economics, 26, 355–379.

Dittmann, I., Maug, E. and Kemper, J. (2004). How Fundamental Are Fundamental Values? Valuation Methods and Their Impact on the Performance of German Venture Capitalists. European Financial Management, 10, 609–638.

Maug, E. (2002). Insider Trading Legislation and Corporate Governance. European Economic Review : EER, 46, 1569-1597.

Maug, E. and Yilmaz, B. (2002). Two-Class Voting : A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Bankruptcy? American Economic Review : AER, 92, 1448-1471.

Maug, E. (2001). Ownership Structure and the Life-Cycle of the Firm : A Theory of the Decision To Go Public. European Finance Review, 5, 167–200.

Maug, E. (2000). The Relative Performance Puzzle. Schmalenbach Business Review : Sbr, 52, 3–24.

Maug, E. (1998). Large Shareholders As Monitors : Is There a Trade-Off Between Liquidity and Control? The Journal of Finance, 53, 65–98.

Maug, E. (1997). Boards of Directors and Capital Structure : Alternative Forms of Corporate Restructuring. Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, 113–139.

Maug, E. (1996). Corporate Control and the Market for Managerial Labour : On the Decision To Go Public. European Economic Review : EER, 40, 1049-1056.